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tion and the necessity to protect scarce natural resources, further
extension of equitable retroactive sanctions can be expected.1
27
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW-FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION
A. THE APA AS A STATUTORY GRANT OF JURISDICTION
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can hear
cases only under a specific jurisdictional grant from Congress. I Juris-
diction to hear claims involving federal agencies is most often con-
127. Since the Natural Gas Act was patterned after the regulatory scheme of its sister
statute, the Federal Power Act, Hearings on H.R. 11662 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 46 (1936); Flittie &
Armour, supra note 17, at 448, 453, it might be expected that the developments discussed herein
would also be applicable to activities regulated under the Federal Power Act. However, no such
analogous developments are evident. Furthermore, immediate extension of Callery, Sunray,
Plaquemines, and Mesa Petroleum to such activities is doubtful because the use of a certificate-
conditioning refund order has been predicated on the FPC's simultaneous licensing and rate-
regulating jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. The problem under the Federal Power Act
is that the FPC has no certification powers under Part II of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-28c
(1970), which grants its primary rate-regulatory power through jurisdiction over interstate
electric utilities. See note 4 supra. The FPC does have license-conditioning authority under Part
I of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 799, 803 (1970), but its jurisdiction to regulate rates under that part,
16 U.S.C. §§ 812-13 (1970), is extremely limited and seldom exercised. See R. BAUM, THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION 176-77, 180 (1942); note 4
supra.
A jurisdictional overlap, on the other hand, could theoretically be construed by attempting
to bridge the separate parts of the Act. When a hydro-electric utility sells or transmits electricity
in interstate commerce, the FPC has jurisdiction under both parts of the Federal Power Act.
In this situation it has been held that provisions of Part I are repealed by implication by
inconsistent or conflicting provisions of the later enacted Part II, Safe Harbor Water Power
Co. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179, 185 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1949); Safe Harbor
Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 124 F.2d 800, 804 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 663 (1942),
and provisions not conflicting or inconsistent can be read together, see 179 F.2d at 186-88. If
the license-conditioning powers of Part I, therefore, can be construed together with the rate-
regulating powers of Part II, refund powers could presumably be implied from the two. The
problem with the above analysis, however, is that the legislative history indicates that a certifica-
tion provision was placed in the original draft of Part II of the Federal Power Act and elimi-
nated upon redrafting, see note 45 supra. Where Congress has thus intended that there be no
licensing powers under Part II of the Federal Power Act, it would be inconsistent to create
implied refunds by interposing the licensing powers of Part I into the rate-regulating provisions
of Part II. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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ferred either by the general jurisdictional grants in title 282 or by
special statutes dealing with individual agencies. 3 These grants of ju-
risdiction, however, are not comprehensive and leave critical gaps.4
The argument is often made that section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act 5 fills these jurisdictional gaps by conferring statutory
jurisdiction on the federal courts.'
2. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1332 (diversity), 1333 (admiralty and mari-
time claims), 1337 (interstate commerce), 1361 (mandamus) (1970).
3. E.g., Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 207 (1970); Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970); and Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970).
See generally BARRON & HOLTZOFF §§ 21,28.
4. See Cramton 436-49. This deficiency is particularly true with respect to actions brought
against a federal administrative agency because most agency legislation does not specifically
provide for jurisdiction and it is often difficult to satisfy all the requisites for the general
jurisdictional statutes in an action against an agency. For example, section 1331 would be
unavailable without an amount in controversy exceeding $10,000, and section 1361 would be
unavailable where there is no duty owed by the federal officer or agency to the plaintiff. Id.
If statutory jurisdiction is otherwise unavailable, a litigant can bring an action under the
general equity jurisdiction of the District Court of the District of Columbia or the Court of
General Sessions of the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 11-521, -961 to -
962 (1966); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290-91 (1944). It might be argued that this source
eliminates any critical jurisdictional gaps. However, such discretionary jurisdiction is inade-
quate because it forces a litigant to bring the action in the District of Columbia and to rely on
the discretion of the court.
5. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (1970), amending 5
U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). See generally Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965); Dickinson.
6. The argument can also be made that the Constitution is a source of federal court jurisdic-
tion. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rav. 1362, 1372 (1953). There is a constitutional right to judicial
review of claims based on a constitutional right, and ". . . a court must always be available to
pass on claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process if the claim
is sustained." Id. The present discussion is limited to statutory grants of jurisdiction and does
not consider this constitutional source.
The argument can also be made that the APA confers jurisdiction on courts of appeals to
review agency determinations. This contention has not been accepted however since section 10's
provisions for review deal "not with appellate court review but with review by an original action
in a court of competent jurisdiction. The court of appeals is not such a court unless specially
authorized by statutory grant of power." City of Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.
1949). See also Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971);
Wisconsin v. FPC, 292 F.2d 753, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Schwab v. Queseda, 284 F.2d 140, 143
(3d Cir. 1960); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 1956). But see
Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d 454, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Examples of special statutes authorizing
a court of appeals to exercise original review are 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970) (FCC) and 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (FPC). See generally BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 58. As a policy matter it
would seem unnecessary to have the APA confer jurisdiction on a court of appeals, since it has
automatic jurisdiction to review any final district court order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
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Section 10 of the APA expressly deals with four elements essential
to obtaining jurisdiction to review agency action, 7 but it fails to spec-
ify the initial and most important element-a statutory grant of juris-
diction. The question of whether section 10 is an implied grant of
jurisdiction was the subject of at least one decision during 197 18 and
was mentioned in several opinions as a possible alternative source of
jurisdiction.9 The issue has been widely debated and it "remains an
open [question], clouded by uncertainty."'' 0 No reference to the juris-
dictional question is made in the APA legislative history., The courts
which have considered the question have reached conflicting conclu-
sions, 2 and those which found section 10 to be an independent source
7. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970) (absence of statutory preclusion of judicial review); id. § 702
(standing); id. § 703 (form and venue).
8. Northwest Residents Ass'n v. HUD, 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
9. E.g., Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397, 401-02 n.10 (2d Cir. 1971); Templeton v.
Dixie Color Printing Co., - F. Supp. _ -n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Delaware v. Pennsyl-
vania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 323 F. Supp. 487,493-95 (D. Del. 1971); General Motors Corp.
v. Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112, 1119-20 (D. Del. 1970).
10. Cramton 445. See also Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390, 394-95 (3d Cir. 1969);
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 679 n.1 (2d Cir.), affd, 387 U.S. 158 (1966);
Byse & Fiocca 328. But see DAVIs (Supp. 1970) 790.
11. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
12. Finding jurisdiction: Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
975 (1966); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), affd on rehearing, 379
F.2d 555 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690
(5th Cir. 1961); Northwest Residents Ass'n v. HUD, 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Templetonv. Dixie Color Printing, _ F. Supp. -_ (N.D. Ala. 1971); Powelton Civic Home
Owners' Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Denying jurisdiction: Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 911 (1970); Pan Am. World Airways v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Twin Cities
Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Chour-
nos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964); Local 542, Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB,
328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955); McEachern v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 706
(W.D.S.C. 1963); Barnes v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mont. 1962); Olin Indus. v.
NLRB, 72 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1947).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reached opposing results without expressly
overruling earlier decisions. Compare Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1970) and Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding jurisdiction)
with Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir. 1960) (denying
jurisdiction). See also Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 227
n.5 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (noting the possibility of jurisdiction); Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 679 n.l (2d Cir.), affd, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) (recognizing the
conflicting decisions).
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have often had alternative sources available.' 3 There has never been a
Supreme Court decision dealing with the issue.'4
The better reasoned view, followed by most of the circuit courts
which have considered the problem, 5 is that section 10 does not confer
jurisdictibn. It increases access to judicial review by widening the
definition of reviewable actions, but does so only for already jurisdic-
tionally empowered courts:
[the APA does not extend] the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases not other-
wise within their competence. The purpose of section 10 is to define the proce-
dures and manner of judicial review of agency action rather than to confer
jurisdiction over the courts. 6
This view is supported by the absence of any reference to statutory
jurisdiction in the legislative history of the APA'7 and, as a matter of
statutory construction, by the express language of the APA. 8
The alternative view, advanced by some commentators'" and a
number of recent decisions,20 contends that the APA is an implied
13. Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Coleman
v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1'966), affd on rehearing, 379 F.2d 555 (1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961). See
generally Cramton 444.
14. See Byse & Fiocca 328-29. But see note 29 infra and accompanying text.
15. See note 12supra.
16. Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 894 (1960). See also Dickinson 576.
17. Although the scope of judicial review was discussed extensively, the expansion of statu-
tory jurisdiction was never explicitly considered in the drafting and enacting of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. See Hearings on Federal Administrative Procedure Before House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1945); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945);
H.R. REP. No. 353, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946). See also 92 CONG. REC. 2148-60, 5788-90 (1946) (remarks of Senator McCarran). See
generally Byse & Fiocca 327-28.
The absence of any discussion of statutory jurisdiction has been explained as an assumption
by the drafters of the APA that at least one of the many federal jurisdictional statutes would
always provide a judicial forum. Id. 328.
18. Section 10(b) of the APA reads: "any applicable form of legal action, . . . in a court
of competent jurisdiction. ... 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970) (emphasis added). Construing the
words "competent jurisdiction" would ordinarily require both subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. Byse & Fiocca 327. In contrast, the Freedom of Information Act has a
specific jurisdictional provision. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). See Note, The Information Act:
Judicial Enforcement of the Records Provision, 54 VA. L. REv. 466, 473-77 (1968). See
generally Dickinson 561-78 for a discussion of the legislative history and the conclusion that
the APA merely codifies a presumption of reviewability and is not a grant of jurisdiction.
19. DAvis (Supp. 1970) § 23.02; JAFFE 164.
20. See note 12 supra.
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source of jurisdiction. 2' Although this position has gained gradual
recognition, "[n]one of the authorities . . . [has given] a reasoned
analysis of the problem.1 2  Most courts which have held section 10
to be a source of statutory jurisdiction have done so by relying on the
familiar presumption in favor of judicial review under the APA.2
However, a presumption in favor of judicial review cannot necessarily
be equated with a presumption in favor of jurisdiction. Empowering
a court to exercise review involves many collateral issues and underly-
ing policy questions, implicit in. such an expansion of jurisdiction,
which could not be adequately considered or disposed of through the
judicial process. For example, is there any justification for a jurisdic-
tional amount when actions are brought against an administrative
agency? The answer depends upon a congressional determination as
to who are the proper parties to bring an action and whether or not
an agency or a federal court will be subjected to a burdensome
amount of litigation. Another important policy consideration is the
proper venue for actions involving federal agencies. 24 The problems
these issues would cause have not been considered or explored by
those courts holding the APA to be a grant of jurisdiction. "[T]he
21. The courts have not been clear in determining the basis for the implication. See, for
example, Northwest Residents Ass'n v. HUD, 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Jurisdiction
is generally implied from the text of section 10(a) and (b). Byse & Fiocca 326-27. However, the
basis might also be the general purpose of section 10, which is to increase access to judicial
review. For a discussion of the implications upon waiver of sovereign immunity when the APA
is held jurisdictional, see pages 244-47 infra and accompanying text.
22. Byse & Fiocca 329.
23. See, for example, Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966) and Powelton
Civic Home Owners' Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). For a discussion of
the presumption in favor of reviewability, see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967);
Dickinson 577; Comment, Judicial Control of Administrative Action: EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 57
VA. L. REV. 676, 692-93 (1971).
A number of courts have converted this presumption in favor of judicial review into one in
favor of jurisdiction. One court has stated: "the Supreme Court has implemented what appears
to be a presumption in favor of a finding of jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure
Act," Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1091 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), affd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). For other courts confusing the two
concepts, see, e.g., Northwest Residents Ass'n v. HUD, 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
School Board of Oskaloosa Co. v. Richardson, 332 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1971). For a
discussion of the presumption in favor of judicial review liberalizing standing requirements, see
1969 Duke Project 198.
24. The Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), which involved analogous policy deter-
minations, represents a Congressional determination that decentralized review, allowing a local
federal court to hear the action, is both necessary and practical. See generally Byse & Fiocca
330-31.
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important goal of subjecting final agency action to judicial scru-
tiny" has been the dominant consideration to these courts.
An intermediate and more justified solution would be to hold that
section 10 confers jurisdiction only when no other statute provides an
alternative grant of statutory jurisdiction to review the agency action
in question. 2 None of the courts have imposed such a limitation in
declaring the APA to be an independent source of jurisdiction, and a
number of them have even held the APA to confer jurisdiction with-
out considering the availability of other jurisdictional sources. 2 This
subordination of express power in jurisdictional statutes to an implied
power in the APA has been neither explained nor justified.
Professor Davis advocates another intermediate solution: since the
APA confers a right28 to judicial review, at least one court must be
jurisdictionally empowered to exercise such review.29 Davis would
avoid some of the collateral issues suggested above3" by requiring that
the APA be read in conjunction with the most applicable express
jurisdictional statute.3 ' There is little authority in support of Professor
Davis' approach which does not fully avoid the collateral issues such
as, what criteria should be used to determine the "most applicable
express jurisdictional statute,' 3 2 and to what extent should section 10
25. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1970), affg
302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
26. See Byse & Fiocca 330.
27. "We find sufficient grounds to accept jurisdiction under the provisions of the . ..
[APA] and thus it is not necessary to determine whether additional jurisdictional basis exists."
Brennan v. Udall, 251 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Colo. 1966), affd, 379 F.2d 803, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 975 (1967). See also cases cited note 13 supra.
28. Davis is referring to a statutory right to judicial review and not a constitutional right
of judicial review. See note 6 supra.
29. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 789-92. Davis finds support for his views in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367 (1962): "[tlhe Supreme Court has quite properly assumed that one who is entitled to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act cannot be denied review on the ground that a district
court lacks jurisdiction .. " DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 789. See also JAFFE 164-65.
30. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
31. For example, under Professor Davis' solution, if an action brought against an agency
under section 1331 was barred by the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, the court could look to
the APA for a grant of jurisdiction. Section 1331 would continue to govern the case for all
matters except the jurisdictional amount, and the jurisdictional amount would still be required
as against any non-agency parties. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 790-92.
32. Davis discusses the APA as a jurisdictional source with respect to a 1331 action but,
because his approach is applicable to any jurisdictional statute relied upon by a litigant when
he would otherwise be unable to obtain an empowered court, guidelines are necessary to deter-
mine if that particular jurisdictional statute is to be expanded by the APA.
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remedy deficiencies in "the most applicable express jurisdictional
statute."
To the extent that jurisdiction is available, judicial review of im-
proper agency action is increased. 33 Some commentators feel that the
ameliorative. effects of such review warrant judicial construction of
the APA as a source of jurisdiction. 34 However, because a jurisdic-
tional expansion needs to be integrated with other statutory sources
of jurisdiction and involves many collateral issues which are not ade-
quately handled through the judiciary's piecemeal approach, decisive
legislation is most often3 and more appropriately advocated as the
proper solution:
[W]e are dealing with a problem that merits statutory clarification. . . as
to the jurisdictional basis for review . . . . If the cases make anything clear,
it is the desirability of Congressional action in this murky and troublesome
area.3 1
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In 1971 four diverse developments in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity' furthered a movement to limit or abrogate2 the doctrine's
33. See generally Berger, supra note 5, at 86, 93-95; McCarran, Improving "Administrative
Justice", Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 893-94 (1946).
34. See DAvis (Supp. 1970) 789-92; JAFFEE 164-65; Byse & Fiocca 329-30.
35. See, e.g., Cramton 445, 468-70. Discussions of this solution, however, are usually di-
rected at eliminating only jurisdictional gaps caused by the minimum jurisdictional amount
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See S. 3568, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1970) and S. 598, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For a discussion of a proposal to amend the APA, see Pending
Proposals To Amend the Administrative Procedure Act:An Analysis of S. 518, 20 AD. L. REV.
185, 200-06 (1968).
36. Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390,400 (3d Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion).
1. The doctrine, simply stated, means that the United States may not be sued without its
consent. Historically, a variety of bases have been advanced in support of sovereign immunity,
but none can withstand a critical analysis. Justice Holmes suggested that a legal right cannot
exist against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Kawanakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). However, this'is not persuasive since the federal govern-
ment has long obeyed the judgments of courts in cases involving legal rights asserted against it.
DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-4, at 906-08. Hamilton argued that a suit against the government
lies outside a federal court's jurisdiction as defined by article III of the Constitution. THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, 567-68 (Dawson ed. 1867). See also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.
553 (1933). See generally WRIGHT §§ 11, 22. The federal courts, in continually reviewing suits
to which the United States has consented, have never accepted Hamilton's argument. Id. § 22.
A third early argument for sovereign immunity was that it was a method by which the courts
could avoid bankrupting "a young and relatively impoverished federal . . . body politic."
Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign
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